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Union states, civil society and national symbols in the nineteenth century:  comparing united 
kingdoms* 
Alvin Jackson, University of Edinburgh 
 
Introduction.  
This essay seeks to offer a set of necessarily provisional reflections on the relationship between 
different multinational unions and civil society and its unifying symbols.  In particular, it is 
structured around three discrete but interlinked questions.  First, given that the premise of the 
essay is the value of comparative approaches, is there in fact a basis for comparing the two 
united kingdoms (Britain and Ireland, Sweden and Norway)?  Second, given that the 
relationship between associational cultures, civil society and the democratic health of a polity 
has been debated at least since the time of de Tocqueville, should we now also be asking 
whether the definition and nature of union states impact upon the shape of civil society?  And 
lastly, in Gramscian terms civil society is the arena in which consent for the hegemony of the 
dominant class is achieved.  Any reflection on the process of consent broaches the question of 
union (or supranational) symbolism and national symbolism within civil society in different 
types of union state.   
 
These, of course, are huge and – at least in terms of their comparative dimensions –  
underresearched questions.  In this essay there is only an opportunity to outline possible 
approaches:  equally, and in terms of the issue of union symbolism, there is only space to touch 
briefly on one case-study - the institution of monarchy and its associated symbolism - in 
introducing the wider theme (Jackson 2012).  Moreover, similar constraints mean that the focus 
of the essay as a whole is on the smaller, rather than the pre-eminent, partners within each of 
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the union polities under consideration – namely Ireland and Scotland, rather than England, in 
the case of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Norway, rather than Sweden, 
in the case of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. 
 
Comparing united kingdoms.   
Taking the first of the central questions - is there any basis for comparing the two united 
kingdoms – Britain and Ireland, Sweden and Norway?   Deborah Cohen, Stefan Berger and 
others have certainly warned about the difficulties of comparative history, and there is clearly 
a case for caution (Berger 2010; Cohen 2001, 2004).  Clearly, too, these different unions (the 
Scottish, Irish, Norwegian and Swedish) sat in very different places on a spectrum of intensity.  
As is well-known, England and Scotland constituted a long-standing personal union which 
became a real or parliamentary union in 1707, and then joined with Ireland in 1801 to form a 
wider parliamentary union in 1801 in the context of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.  
Sweden and Norway constituted a personal union, newly minted in the context of the last stages 
of the European war, but drawing upon an older heritage of engagement.  Each had co-existed 
alongside Denmark in the Kalmar union (1397-1523); and after the Swedes’ revolt and 
secession, a Danish-Norwegian union had lived on until the Treaty of Kiel (1814), when (in 
the context of military defeat) Denmark and Norway were separated, and Norway and Sweden 
now bound together.  The British unions were determined by Scots and English parliamentary 
legislation of 1706 and a treaty of 1707, together with regular Irish and British legislation in 
1800.  By contrast, the union of Sweden and Norway was in part circumscribed by the 
Norwegian constitution of 1814 – a written or codified constitution - as well as by the Riksakten 




However, understanding the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland in the nineteenth century 
simply as a uniform parliamentary union makes little sense in the light of the different types of 
constituent union (parliamentary and personal) as well as the overall incoherence of the 
enterprise. As Richard Lodge (professor of history at the University of Edinburgh) said in 1907, 
the Scots union ‘was at its origin illogical and will probably be illogical at the end.  It may well 
be that this is the secret of its success’ (Hume Brown 1907:   173-4).  The Scots and Irish (and 
Welsh and Hanoverian) unions were all quite distinct and were associated with different types 
of civil society and public sphere.   
 
Moreover, the multiple monarchies and unions of the United Kingdom, and of Sweden and 
Norway, merit comparison partly because the two United Kingdoms were contemporary 
creations (1800-1 and 1814-15 respectively), partly because the United Kingdom was an 
important influence on the creation of the United Kingdoms (through the Treaty of Stockholm 
(1813) and the Treaty of Kiel (1814)), and partly because contemporaries also frequently made 
the comparison.  Some – in Sweden – came to see the British union as a possible endpoint for 
their own union with Norway; some in Britain – like Gladstone – subsequently considered that 
Sweden and Norway might serve as a paradigm for constitutional reform in Britain itself 
(Björnsterna 1840: 19; Jackson 2017).  Each was of course an asymmetrical union of large and 
small partners, and much of the resultant chemistry of union arose from these imbalances.  Each 
was a unique balance of contemporary strategic or geo-political exigency and historic linkage. 
 
Union and civil society.   
Are the definition and nature of union related to the shape of civil society and vice versa?   This 
key question  is effectively an extension of the debate on the links between associational 
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cultures, civil society and a stable democratic polity.  As R.J. Morris has argued, ‘the nature of 
the state and its agencies was an enabling and limiting factor in all cases [of civil society]’ 
(Morris 2006: 15).  He has also argued that ‘the ability of an associational culture to contribute 
to a liberal pluralist civil society depended … upon the spatial and cultural context of the state’ 
(Morris 2006: 16).  We need to extend these insights by looking at the relationship between 
civil society and the union state – though (again) only a very tentative start to this task may be 
made within the parameters of this essay. 
 
In essence the proposition of this essay is that each of these distinctive unions – 
English/Scottish, British/Irish, Norwegian/Swedish – was associated with a distinctive civil 
society and national symbolism; and that each ultimately was related to the condition and 
prospects of the union. In particular the suggestions here are that - the origin of civil societies 
was critical to their relationship with union; the flexibility and representativeness of union 
settlements were related to the nature of civil society; and (last) the stability of union 
settlements was related to the symbolism of the union state – especially royal symbolism – and 
its acceptability to civil society.  All of the three societies discussed – Scotland, Ireland, 
Norway – accepted to some extent the symbolism of monarchy; but not all accepted the explicit 
symbolism of union, which was more contentious.   
 
Union and civil society in Scotland.   
Looking briefly at Scotland first:  this might reasonably be characterised as an incomplete but 
comparatively inclusive union.  Civil society was defined in several senses in eighteenth  and 
nineteenth century Scotland.  It was given one key textual definition by Adam Ferguson, who 
(writing in An essay on the history of civil society in 1767) was concerned with the problem of 
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sustaining the liberty of the individual in the context of an ordered society’ (Morris 2006: 2).  
Samuel Smiles (born in East Lothian and an Edinburgh University graduate), published his 
Self-Help in 1859 – a work which was translated into Swedish by 1867 (and Danish by 1869) 
and which was strongly associated with self-improvement and associationalism.  Jim Livesey 
(in his Civil society and empire) has gone further than this, arguing that the origins of civil 
society itself may be located in the efforts of those Scots and Irish within the eighteenth century 
British Atlantic empire who sought to accommodate their loss of citizenship within the 
conditions of union and empire (Livesey 2009: 7).  In addition Livesey has highlighted the 
critical distinction between the success of Scots civil society in the later eighteenth century and 
afterwards and the collapse of its Irish counterpart in the 1790s. 
 
Some further expansion of these observations is clearly required.  Yes, the Scottish union of 
1707 brought the loss of a separate Scottish citizenship with the emergence of the union or 
imperial state.  But it was also inclusive of the major interests in Scottish society.  It allowed 
an essential degree of flexibility within the new constitutional relationships – stemming in part 
from its incompleteness.  Scotland preserved its distinctive legal system (based on roman law), 
its royal burghs and their privileges, its heritable jurisdictions (until 1747), and its Presbyterian 
church, its banking system and its universities.  All of these were distinctive national 
institutions which served as focuses for patriotic pride within the union state.   
 
This particular type of incomplete and flexible union conditioned the forms of civil society 
which emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  The relatively limited scope of 
union created the space for civil society associational cultures: the ultimately inclusive and 
accommodationist nature of union ensured that these cultures would augment rather than 
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subvert union.  Indeed, by the mid-Victorian era Scotland’s historic national institutions were 
complemented by a distinctive Scottish civic culture with a range of patriotically inclined 
voluntary associations, spanning philanthropy, religion, science, literature and commerce.   
 
Mediating between this vibrant local culture and the relatively weak (though expanding) British 
state were the politics and ideology of what has been called ‘unionist nationalism’.  ‘Unionist 
nationalism’  embodied a commitment to the union, and indeed an interest in closer union; but 
this was contingent upon patriotic fulfilment within local institutions and the continuing 
benefits and light touch of the union government:  as Graeme Morton has argued, ‘because of 
the way in which civil society was governed in the mid-nineteenth century Scottish nationalism 
was loyal to the union of 1707’ (see Morton 1999: 10).  The intrusion of the state or perceived 
inequalities within the governance of the union, could give rise to patriotic protest.  But such 
protest accepted the principle of union – even when it was opposed to innovations within its 
practice (Jackson 2012: 136). 
 
In short, the inclusive and flexible nature of union was associated with the associational 
cultures of a civil society which was both patriotically Scottish and unionist.  Scottish civil 
society, including the press, served to complement union.   
 
Union and civil society in Ireland. 
The Irish union, incomplete yet also exclusive, shared some characteristics with its Scottish 
counterpart, but there were also decisive differences.  Again, the layering of union needs to be 




In Ireland the parliamentary union of 1800-1, like its Scots precursor of 1707, preserved a set 
of distinctive national institutions – the administration (Dublin Castle), the viceregal court and 
executive, the courts and judiciary, and legal process.  As in Scotland, there was an effort 
through union to connect the state to the forces of religion.  But the specific intention of binding 
the union with concessions to the majority religious community (Catholicism) failed 
completely and with lasting consequences. 
 
Union, therefore, acquired an exclusive, even sectarian, inflection almost from the moment of 
its promulgation.  The distinctive Irish institutions which were retained after the union were in 
the hands of a dominant religious and social elite in Irish society – the Anglican (episcopal) 
landed class known sometimes as the ‘Protestant ascendancy’.  Unlike Scotland, the institutions 
of the union state in Ireland could not fully accommodate a popular patriotic or national 
identity.  And this therefore defined a different role and function for civil society in Ireland 
than in Scotland.  Moreover, unlike Scotland, too, the chronology of the growth of civil society 
in Ireland was separate from that of the union state:  it certainly preceded the acts of union in 
1800.  
 
In essence, economic growth and intellectual Enlightenment in the second half of the 
eighteenth century helped to generate new forms of sociability and civil society in Ireland:  
Michael Brown has defined the period between 1730 and 1780 as the ‘apogee of the social 
Enlightenment’:  it ‘saw the emergence of a literary public sphere marked by novel modes of 
communication (newspapers), changes in old mechanisms for divulging information (the 
culture of the theatre for instance) and new locations (the coffee house)’ (Brown 2016: 210).  
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Economic growth also simultaneously disrupted the precarious sectarian frontiers in a society 
where political authority was not only associated with propertied exclusivity, but also with 
religious exclusivity.  Most Irish historians agree that civil society broke down in the 1790s in 
the context of the profound stresses created by the war.  Insurgency in 1796-98 and the 
imposition of union in 1800 were in part expressions of that failure.  
   
In Ireland neither the formation nor the consolidation of union were supported by civil society, 
therefore.  It was rather the case that union was imposed upon a society where civil society had 
broken down; and that union helped (indirectly) to shape its radical and sectarianized 
restructuring.  What re-emerged gradually in nineteenth century Ireland was a civil society 
which, as in the late nineteenth century Netherlands, was fragmented or ‘pillarised’ along 
confessional lines.  Unlike in Scotland, where civil society functioned as a complement to 
union, in Ireland – as also in Norway – the civil society of the nineteenth century looked 
increasingly to alternative state formations.   
 
And unlike in the Netherlands, where it has been said that ‘the pillars and the pillarised 
voluntary associations articulated religious and political antagonisms in society but stabilised 
it also’, this was not the case in Ireland (de Vries 2006: 116).  In Ireland civil society was 
redefined in the mid/late nineteenth century in opposition to the union state – generating clashes 
between the two as well as special restrictions on civil liberty, including upon the freedom of 
the press,  which were not generally applied in Britain.  In some ways, though, the Irish 
experience was not unique:  as Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann argues in his overview of 
contemporary European civil society, ‘the expansion, democratisation and politicisation of 
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voluntary associations were … a cause of the crisis of European civil societies before World 
War I’ (Hoffman 2006:  89).   
 
Union and civil society in Sweden-Norway.  
Like the Scots and Irish unions, the Swedish-Norwegian union was formulated in the context 
of the flexing of military muscle by the dominant partner.  Like the earlier two unions, the 
Swedish-Norwegian union was partly anchored in the geopolitics of international warfare and 
its settlement. Like the earlier two unions, it drew upon a complex set of historical associations 
and rivalries, and sought to reconcile these.  Like the earlier two unions, though more so, the 
Swedish-Norwegian union was limited and therefore offered an opportunity for the creation of 
associational cultures and the wider development of civil society.  Unlike the Scots and Irish 
unions, which were enacted by regular parliamentary legislation, the Norwegian was 
circumscribed by a written constitution (of 1814) and by an act of the Storting which had 
constitutional status.   
 
Unlike these earlier unions, therefore, the Swedish-Norwegian union was a relatively 
constricted or tightly defined settlement.  Attempts to revise the union either informally, 
through the action of the monarch (such as Carl XIV Johan), or formally, through the work of 
recurrent joint union committees, generally failed.  Successive union monarchs flexed and 
swayed, sometimes (as with Carl Johan) pushing a relatively assertive and unionist agenda but 
often (again as with Carl Johan) accepting defeat at the hands of the Storting (Michalsen 2014: 




Still, these constraints on union and on the state created space for civil society in Norway as 
well as for the nation state.  Torkel Jannson of Uppsala has suggested that in the United 
Kingdoms ‘the state … dissociated itself from a number of functions it had previously fulfilled, 
and that society consequently had no choice but to associate itself’:  Norwegian society through 
the nineteenth century certainly came to be strongly marked by ‘private civic associations’ or, 
alternatively, ‘a new “association spirit”’ (Jannson 2016: 687; Langholm 2016: 972).    Most 
historians argue that the principles of voluntary association were spreading in Norway from 
the 1820s and 1830s, and that they were linked with economic growth – including the 
emergence of a newly commercialised agricultural economy in the nineteenth century.  
Emphasis has been laid (by Norbert Götz) upon the role of poor relief organisation, Protestant 
revivalism and temperance within these evolving associational cultures.  Götz, indeed, has 
defined the period from the mid-nineteenth century through to c.1930 as the ‘pre-corporatist’ 
heyday of autonomous associational activity (Götz 2003: 42-3). 
 
Different forms of civil society and public sphere activity flourished in Sweden.   A trope of 
contemporary British comment was certainly the contrast between democratic Norway and 
aristocratic Sweden:  for the radical Scots traveller, Samuel Laing, journeying in the later 
1830s, ‘Sweden [in the first decades of the union] is still under its ancien regime, while Norway 
is practically in advance of the age in its enjoyment of institutions favourable to political 
liberty’ (Laing 1836: 134).  In Sweden, Laing observed, ‘the press is under a very strict 




The associational cultures of Norway and Sweden (as of Ireland and Scotland) were of course 
linked to improved communications (telegraphs, national postal system, rail networks) - and 
(from 1850) a rapidly expanding press.  The ‘growth of local newspapers in the 1850s turned 
the press into a major instrument of national unification’ in Sweden (Petterson 2016: 987).  
More than in Scotland or Ireland, the press in Sweden and Norway was characterised by a 
national rather than a union appeal.  
  
Was there any evidence of union civic cultures or a union civil society in Sweden and Norway?  
It was certainly the case that up to the 1860s Scandinavianism, while by no means co-equal 
with union feeling, was linked with some associational cultures which looked to the 
maintenance of the United Kingdoms (eg the rifle club movement in Sweden) (Hemstad 2010; 
Petterson 2016: 989).  But these tended to be exceptional. 
 
In short, the restrictive, constrained, light-touch union created more space for civil society.  But 
it was a national civil society which was the result, rather than a supra-national or multinational 
union version such as may be said to have existed in Scotland.  Moreover, given religious 
homogeneity, it was a coherent national civil society, unlike its pillarised equivalent in 
contemporary Ireland.   
 
Civil society, monarchy and the symbolism of the union state. 
How much did civil society accept the symbolism of the union state – taking that associated 
with the monarchy as a preliminary case-study?  In Scotland an agreed and inclusive union 
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permitted (on the whole) the infiltration throughout civil society of the symbolism of union, 
often casual or implicit.  In Ireland, however, the exclusive, incomplete and dynamic nature of 
union created confrontations between the symbols of the United Kingdom and those of the 
growing national movement.   There are some similarities between Ireland and Norway in this 
respect:  on the whole, however, the clash between Irish national and United Kingdom symbols 
was greater because the presence of the Union state weighed more heavily there than its 
counterpart in Norway.   
 
However, what one might describe (adapting the Freudian formulation) as the narcissism of 
small national difference was still a feature of both United Kingdoms and both Ireland and 
Norway (and even to a lesser extent) Scotland.  This has a particular relevance for union states, 
which often (if not invariably) brought together peoples and polities who were essentially 
similar.  In these circumstances, the symbols of difference naturally acquired a much greater 
significance than might otherwise have been the case.   
 
With Sweden and Norway, even at the mid-nineteenth century zenith of the United Kingdoms, 
flags, coats of arms, and royal titles all fed into a festering rancour with union.  Norway 
underlined its independent existence within the context of the union state through a separate 
national flag, which was devised in 1821.  Oscar I famously introduced a compromise 
arrangement for the flag in 1844, which remained in place in Norway until 1898-9 (and in 
Sweden until 1905) – but it was a continuing reminder to patriotic Norwegians of the 




Equally, in an age when heraldic emblems mattered, coats of arms could accelerate 
resentments.  Heraldry was not just a matter of royal or aristocratic flummery, but (as Fridtjof 
Nansen observed in 1905) was associated with a range of everyday official institutions, 
including (crucially) the coinage (Nansen 1905: 28 n.1).   The representation of the kingdom 
of Hungary on the Habsburg armorials was an issue of contention until 1915 – virtually until 
the end of the Dual Monarchy.  The coat of arms of Sweden and Norway, which originally 
rendered the rampant Norwegian lion merely as a quartering of the Swedish arms, generated 
the same kind of animus as the flag question.  This was only partly resolved with Oscar I’s 
tactful uniting of the Norwegian and Swedish emblems on equal terms within the royal coat of 
arms (after 1844).  Even then, Nansen complained that the Swedes had represented Norway in 
this way ‘just as though Norway were actually a province of Sweden … [and that] it was only 
after considerable opposition from Norway that this [heraldry] was given up’ (Nansen 1905: 
28, n.1).    
 
Focusing on monarchy and its symbols, generally these have served as critical binding agents 
within the multinational unions of nineteenth century Europe, often infiltrating all aspects of 
civil society.  Oszkár Jázsi, the great chronicler of the fall of the Dual Monarchy, saw the 
Habsburgs as a clear centripetal force within Austria-Hungary:  other, more recent 
commentators, looking at the symbolism and supra national identities generated by loyalty to 
the monarchy have echoed this judgement.   
 
Scotland and even Scottish nationalism worked largely within monarchical frameworks:  the 
parliamentary union of 1707 was built on a union of the crowns of England and Scotland, which 
had been formulated in 1603, when the king of Scotland, James VI, had assumed the throne of 
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England.  Scottish ownership of the British monarchy and union was therefore profound – it 
was a Scottish dynasty which ruled Britain until 1714, and in the nineteenth century successive 
members of the new Hanoverian ruling family sought to emphasise their supposed historic 
linkages with Scotland and Scottish culture.  The symbolism of monarchy was accordingly a 
pervasive and accepted feature of civil society throughout Scotland.  
  
This was only true in a highly limited way for Ireland.  Here the stamp of the union monarchy 
certainly infiltrated the ‘pillarised’ civil society of late nineteenth century Ireland, but primarily 
within its Protestant and middle class aspects.  For Catholic Ireland the lack of any clear 
ownership of the national monarchy (in contrast to Scotland), together with the apparent 
political and economic failure of the union, created divisions over the institution and its 
symbolism.  Royal visits were contentious occasions:  royal statues and street-naming were 
equally contested.  British monarchs like Queen Victoria responded by showing a clear and 
obvious preference for Scotland above Ireland.  In short, the Scots had ownership of the British 
monarchy and its symbolism, where the Irish did not (Jackson 2012:  153-163, 199-207). 
 
What of Norway?  As with other unions, monarchy was an important binding agent in Sweden 
and Norway – indeed, given the nature of the Norwegian and Swedish Riksakten (1815) the 
crown is often regarded as the only binding agent:  Dag Michalsen has observed that ‘the legal 
relationship between the two countries was defined only through the common king’ (Michalsen 
2014: 213; Derry 1973: 18).  The monarchy had been a keystone of the union between Norway 
and Denmark (Arnold Barton has said that ‘the Norwegian peasants were proverbially loyal to 
the king in Copenhagen, regarding him as their protector against bureaucratic abuse’) (Barton 
2003: 7).  The institutional binding of the monarchy with Norway was further tightened by the 
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fact that until 1891 the heir to the throne served conventionally as the Norwegian viceroy, while 
the king also appointed a statholder – an office held originally by Swedes (until 1829) but later 
(1836-56) by two prominent Norwegians, successively Herman Wedel-Jarlsberg and Severin 
LØvenskiold until its final abolition in 1872.   
 
Norway, like Scotland, was heavily infiltrated by, and accepting of, the symbolism associated 
with the central institution of the union, namely the monarchy. The popularity of the monarchy 
and its symbols in Norway was certainly repeatedly observed and noted, including (for 
example) by British commentators and travellers like H.D. Inglis, Samuel Laing and 
R.G.Latham – all writing in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Latham observed in 
1840, for example, that lithographs of the future Oscar I and his wife were conventionally 
displayed in Norwegian homes alongside the Eidsvoll constitution (Latham 1840: i, 100; ii, 
102)      
 
The success of royal visits to Norway was a staple of (even radical) British commentary in the 
nineteenth century, and these visits generally elicited impressive displays of support and loyalty 
which had a clear physical or symbolic manifestation.  But a striking feature of British 
narratives was not only the detail that they captured:  they also often explicitly compared royal 
visits to Norway to a critical epiphany in the history of the British monarchy – namely George 
IV’s coronation tour in Scotland and Ireland of 1821-22.  Samuel Laing, for example, was 
present when Carl Johan visited Levanger in Norway in January 1835, and he was keen to 
contrast the easy and natural relationship between the Norwegians and the monarchy with the 
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evidently ‘pretentious, laboured and theatrical efforts of the Hanoverian court in Scotland’ 
(Laing 1836: 385).  
 
Of course this Norwegian loyalism and monarchism was not synonymous with unionist 
sentiment. Later monarchs were treated respectfully, if not enthusiastically.  But it is striking 
that, despite republican sympathies in the Storting, Norway ultimately voted to retain its 
monarchy – the symbolic continuities being underlined by the new king’s choice of royal name, 
Haakon VII, following on from Haakon VI of Norway (who had died in 1380).   
 
In short, Scotland had ownership of the British monarchy and of the union.  The Irish had a 
weaker hold over the monarchy, though there were efforts by some national leaders (pre-
eminently John Redmond between 1900 and 1918) to redefine the monarch as a national rather 
than exclusively a supranational (or union) asset.  In this and other respects Norway was a 
model for Redmond, since the ruler of the united kingdoms was as much a national monarch 
as a union phenomenon.  And (as certainly British commentators regularly noted) the 
Bernadottes worked hard in Norway, like the Hanoverians did in Scotland, to make themselves 
both national and supranational monarchs. 
 
Summation.    
This essay has sought to pose some fresh questions about multi-national union states.  But if 
the questions are fresh, the answers (however provisional) may be sometimes familiar.  In 
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particular, as with other aspects of the debate on civil society, these answers tend to be highly 
contingent.  One-size taxonomies will not do.   
 
Could a unifying civil society transcend the nation, developing within the parameters of the 
nineteenth century multi-national union state?  The answer to this is a tentative ‘yes’ – but that 
the possibility depended upon the nature of the union in question.  In Scotland associational 
cultures and civil society developed after the union.  The union, in turn, was linked to economic 
liberty, progress and the consolidation of the Scottish nation.  The relative flexibility and 
inclusivity and incompleteness of union in Scotland created space for associational cultures 
and a civil society which in turn worked to support union.  Royal symbolism heavily infiltrated 
civil society.   
 
In Ireland union was instituted on the ruins of one form of civil society.  As in Scotland, so in 
Ireland, union was incomplete and left space for associational cultures and civil society.  But 
union was also associated with social and religious exclusivity.  And it was therefore associated 
with the evolution of another, sectarianized and pillarised, form of civil society – one which 
was not only unsupportive of union but which represented a challenge and counter-state.   
 
In Norway definitions of union were much tighter than in Ireland or Scotland, determined as 
they were by the constitution.  This gave space for associational cultures and the public sphere; 
but it meant that the opportunities for the disruptive advance of union, while not eradicated, 
did not exist in the same way as in Scotland and Ireland.  As in Ireland, though for different 
reasons, civil society was organised along largely national rather than union lines.  But in 
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Norway civil society and the union state generally did not conflict – largely because there was 
so little of the union state with which to fight.   
 
In short, in Scotland and Ireland union was able to flex and adapt – but in the Irish case with 
bloody consequences.  In Norway, the tight constitutional parameters of union were vigorously 
policed by the Storting and ultimately facilitated a largely velvet divorce.  Little wonder, then, 




*An earlier version of this paper was given as the introductory lecture to the UCL/University 
of Oslo conference on ‘The Public Sphere and Freedom of Expression:  Britain and the Nordic 
countries, 1750-1900’ at UCL on 7 June 2018.  I am grateful to the organisers, Dr Elettra 
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